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Abstract: In the European context, two legal instruments are used to regulate compensation for 
damage occasioned by delay in the carriage by air of passengers. The way in which these two 
instruments interact is unclear, and some of the highest courts interpret them in contradictory ways. 
As a result, air passengers’ rights are ambiguous, and air carriers’ liability limits are vague. This paper 
addresses these issues from a damage/compensation point of view. A proposal is made that could 
create more legal certainty both for the hundreds of millions of passengers that are carried each year 
in the European Union (EU) and for the airlines that must bear the cost of these European air passenger 
rights – which equates to around four billion euros annually.1 
Keywords: Damage occasioned by delay in the carriage by air of passengers; European Air Passenger 
Rights Regulation; Montreal Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage 
by Air; Warsaw Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by 
Air; exclusivity; uniformity; coexistence; identical damage; individual damage; further compensation; 
supplementary compensation; double recovery; deduction; air carrier’s liability limits; material and 
non-material damages. 
1. Introduction 
The departures board reads “FLIGHT DELAYED”. What now? 
Don’t panic – if a flight is delayed there is a cross-border legal instrument that provides you with air 
passenger rights. In fact, there are two – the worldwide Montreal Convention on international air 
carrier liability (MC)2 and the European Air Passenger Rights Regulation (APRR).3 
As a passenger, some questions immediately spring to mind. Are both legal instruments applicable? 
Can I combine them? Will I be compensated twice or are both instruments complementary? Can I make 
a choice about which of the two instruments I would prefer to use, or does one prevail over the other? 
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1 International Air Transport Association (IATA), “Passenger Rights”, 
<https://www.iata.org/policy/Documents/pax-rights.pdf> (last visited 12 February 2017), pp. 1–3, at p. 1, para. 
4. 
2 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage by Air (signed at Montreal on 28 May 
1999). 
3 Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 February 2004 establishing 
common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation 
or long delay of flights, and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/1991, [2004] OJ L 46/1. 
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These questions are important, not only for you as a passenger but also for the whole airline industry. 
The MC is one of the most important multilateral conventions of international carriage by air and 
counts 122 State Parties (and one “Regional Economic Integration Organisation” – the EU).4 The APRR 
is applicable to every flight departing from the EU and every flight flying towards the EU (the latter if 
the carrier is classed as a Community Carrier).5 In 2015 more than 900 million passengers were carried 
by air in the EU.6 The answers to the above questions will have a huge impact on the sector. Now it’s 
time – panic! 
This paper begins with an outline of the different views on the MC’s exclusivity provision and 
introduces the two leading common law cases (section 2). It then discusses the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ)’s opposite interpretations on exclusivity and damage (3) and tackles the legal 
consequences concerning the extent of the air passenger’s compensation and the limits of the air 
carrier’s liability (4). After pointing out the views on material and non-material damages by United 
States judges and the ECJ (5), a model is proposed in an attempt to bring both instruments together in 
a more complementary and legally consistent way (6). 
2. Exclusivity and coexistence 
Article 29 MC states: 
In the carriage of passengers, baggage and cargo, any action for damages, however founded, 
whether under this Convention or in contract or in tort or otherwise, can only be brought subject 
to the conditions and such limits of liability as are set out in this Convention without prejudice 
to the question as to who are the persons who have the right to bring suit and what are their 
respective rights. In any such action, punitive, exemplary or any other non-compensatory 
damages shall not be recoverable. 
The key question is whether or not article 29 gives the MC exclusive application, regardless of any 
other relevant legal instrument. 
2.1 Uniformity 
Uniform rules – In the early days of international air transport there were no uniform rules of law 
governing the carriage of passengers. Different legal systems approached particular situations in 
different ways. A set of uniform rules, with the force of international law, was very desirable. By 
providing such a set – the MC – many conflict-of-law questions were eliminated and most choice-of-
law problems were side stepped.7 
                                                          
4 Status of ratification: International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), 
<http://icao.int/secretariat/legal/List%20of%20Parties/Mtl99_EN.pdf> (last visited 12 February 2017). 
5 Article 2(c) APRR defines “Community Carrier” as “an air carrier with a valid operating licence granted by [an 
EU] Member State in accordance with the provisions of [Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 of 24 September 2008 on 
common rules for the operation of air services in the Community (Recast), [2008] OJ L 293/3]”. 
6 The total number of passengers carried by air is 918,209,300 (arrivals plus departures). Source: Eurostat, 
<http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=ttr00012> (last visited 
12 February 2017). 
7 McClean (ed.), Shawcross and Beaumont: Air Law (Butterworths, loose-leaf), vol. 1, VII, paras. 124 and 126 (and 
references). 
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Article 29 MC’s aim is to ensure that the liability regime of the MC is not undermined by any other 
provisions. In the event of damage, such as delay, other claims also exist in most cases, often based on 
national laws. Without article 29 MC, there is the risk that claimants could choose whichever legal basis 
appears to be the most favourable to them in their specific situation. As a result, the MC’s application 
would largely be left to chance, and its purpose, the creation of legal unity, would be called into 
question.8 The aim of the MC is to unify the rules to which it applies. If this aim is to be achieved, 
exceptions to these rules should only be permitted where the MC itself provides for them.9 
If an international convention provides that its remedies are exclusive, then any inconsistent domestic 
law of ratifying states addressing the same subject must not be applied. This is particularly true with 
respect to international conventions that seek to harmonise private international rules across 
jurisdictions.10 
2.2 Certain uniformity 
Certain rules – The MC is a “Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage 
by Air”. The title alone suggests that it does not tackle all issues (private rights) connected with 
international carriage by air but merely certain rules in particular need of standardisation. Other 
matters remain subject to the applicable national or supra-national (European) law. In the absence of 
any express statement to the contrary, national law will always apply where the MC is silent.11 
To determine whether or not a convention is exclusive, it is important to consider the scope of the 
convention, its applicability, and the special issues that are dealt with in the convention. If the question 
at issue is not addressed by the convention, remedies may be found in applicable domestic law.12 
The ECJ stated in its famous IATA case13 that a delay in the carriage of passengers by air causes two 
types of damage. Since the MC only addresses one type of damage, according to the Court, the EU is 
therefore free to regulate the other type of damage (below, “3. The ECJ’s two types of damage”).14 
                                                          
8 See Giemulla and Schmid (eds.), Montreal Convention (Wolters Kluwer, loose-leaf), Commentary, Chapter III, 
Article 29, paras. 1–2. 
9 Sidhu and others v British Airways [1996] UKHL 5, 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199697/ldjudgmt/jd961214/abnett02.htm> (last visited 12 
February 2017), (vii), (a). 
10 Dempsey and Johansson, “Montreal v. Brussels: The Conflict of Laws on the Issue of Delay in International Air 
Carriage”, [2010] Air and Space Law, pp. 207–224, at p. 208 (and references). 
11 See Giemulla and Schmid (eds.), Montreal Convention, Commentary, Introduction, paras. 37 and 43. 
12 Dempsey and Johansson, “Montreal v. Brussels: The Conflict of Laws”, p. 208 (and references). 
13 International Air Transport Association (IATA) and European Low Fares Airline Association (ELFAA) v 
Department for Transport (C-344/04) EU:C:2006:10. 
14 See also IATA (C-344/04), paras. 43–46. 
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2.3 Strict uniformity 
United Kingdom – The Sidhu case15 is one of the leading decisions on the interpretation of article 29 
MC.16 Although the regulatory framework in that case was the Warsaw Convention (WC),17 which is 
the MC’s predecessor, the same might well be said today of the MC.18 The issue was whether the 
passenger, who suffered personal injury arising out of detention (by invading Iraqi forces) in the 
terminal at Kuwait but for whom no action lay under the WC, had an action in respect of that injury 
against the air carrier at common law.19 
In the Sidhu case, Lord Hope stated that Chapter III of the WC (“Liability of the Carrier") is designed to 
set out all the rules relating to the liability of the carrier that are to be applicable to all international 
carriage of persons, baggage or cargo by air to which the Convention applies. He explains the structure 
of the provisions as follows: “On the one hand the carrier surrenders his freedom to exclude or to limit 
his liability. On the other hand the passenger or other party to the contract is restricted in the claims 
which he can bring in an action of damages by the conditions and limits set out in the Convention.” 
Exceptions, whereby a passenger could sue outside the Convention for losses sustained in the course 
of international carriage by air, would distort the whole comprehensive system, even in cases for which 
the Convention did not create any liability on the part of the carrier. It is very clear to Lord Hope that 
in all questions relating to the carrier’s liability, the provisions of the Convention apply and the 
passenger does not have access to any other remedies.20 
In his conclusions, Lord Hope admits that an answer that leaves claimants without a remedy is not at 
first sight attractive. However, he is convinced that “in those areas with which [the Convention] deals 
— and the liability of the carrier is one of them — the [Convention] is intended to be uniform and to be 
exclusive also of any resort to the rules of domestic law.” The object and structure of the Convention 
made it clear to him that the WC was not designed to provide remedies against the carrier to enable 
all losses to be compensated. Instead, it was designed to define those situations in which 
compensation was to be available. Lord Hope wanted to respect the balance that was struck, in the 
interests of certainty and uniformity, and concluded: “where the Convention has not provided a 
remedy, no remedy is available.”21 
United States – In the US it is also clear that whenever a claim is based upon events occurring in the 
course of international transportation by air (within the meaning of the WC or MC), the liability rules 
of the Convention are exclusive and pre-empt all local and national laws. If the Convention governs a 
claim for damages, and liability cannot be established under its rules, passengers cannot bring an 
action for damages under any national, state or local law. In other words, if the Convention’s liability 
rules do not recognise the claim, there can be no liability of the air carrier based on local or national 
                                                          
15 Sidhu [1996] UKHL 5, 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199697/ldjudgmt/jd961214/abnett02.htm> (last visited 12 
February 2017). 
16 Prassl and Bobek, “Welcome Aboard” in Prassl and M. Bobek (eds.), Air Passenger Rights – ten years on (Hart 
Publishing, 2015), pp. 1–21, at p. 17. 
17 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air (signed at Warsaw on 
12 October 1929). 
18 Giemulla and Schmid (eds.), Montreal Convention, Commentary, Chapter III, Article 29, para. 2. 
19 Clarke, Contracts of Carriage by Air, 2nd edition (Lloyd’s List, 2010), p. 8. 
20 See also Sidhu (1996) UKHL 5, (vii), (a). 
21 See also Sidhu (1996) UKHL 5, Conclusions. 
5 
 
law.22 Even before the United States Supreme Court’s decision in the – now leading – Tseng case,23 
most courts held that the Convention cause of action was exclusive and pre-empted all state law based 
causes of action.24 Those cases decided before the Tseng case, permitting state law claims to be 
pursued even though the Convention was applicable (and thus rejecting the pre-emptive effect of its 
liability rules), have effectively been overruled by the US Supreme Court in Tseng and can no longer be 
regarded as authoritative.25 
The arguments used in the Tseng judgment were similar to the Sidhu case – the latter was ruled only 
a few years earlier. The negotiating and drafting history; the unification goal; the textual emphasis; the 
comprehensive scheme of liability; and the intention to balance the interests of passengers and air 
carriers were again the decisive factors. 
3. The ECJ’s two types of damage 
Identical damage and individual damage – As mentioned above, the ECJ stated in its IATA case that 
delay in the carriage of passengers by air causes two types of damage: (a) “identical damage” (damage 
that is almost identical for every passenger); and (b) “individual damage” (damage that is inherent in 
the reason for travelling). It is clear to the ECJ that the MC only addresses (b), individual damage. As a 
result, the EU is free to regulate (a), identical damage, the type of damage not tackled by the MC.26 
The first type of damage (a) is damage that is almost identical for every passenger of the (excessively) 
delayed flight. Therefore, according to the ECJ, redress may take the form of standardised and 
immediate assistance or care for everybody concerned.27 The APRR translates this assistance and care 
into an obligation for the operating air carrier28 to offer, free of charge, meals and refreshments,29 two 
telephone calls30 and, if necessary, hotel accommodation31 (transport between the airport and place 
of accommodation included).32 Since the Sturgeon case,33 passengers of a delayed flight are also 
                                                          
22 See Tompkins, Liability Rules Applicable to International Air Transportation as Developed by the Courts in the 
United States (Wolters Kluwer, 2010), p. 96 (including the many references to case law). 
23 El Al Israel Airlines v Tsui Yuan Tseng [1999] 525 U.S. 155. 
24 See Tompkins, Liability Rules Applicable to International Air Transportation, p. 97 (including the many 
references to case law). 
25 See Tompkins, Liability Rules Applicable to International Air Transportation, p. 99 (including the many 
references to case law). 
26 See also IATA (C-344-04), paras. 43–46. 
27 See IATA (C-344-04), para. 43. 
28 When the operating air carrier reasonably expects a flight to be delayed beyond its scheduled time of departure 
for two, three, four hours or more, depending on the distance of the flight ((a) two hours or more in the case of 
flights of 1,500km or less; (b) three hours or more in the case of all intra-Community flights of more than 1,500km 
and of all other flights between 1,500km and 3,500km; (c) four hours or more in the case of all flights not falling 
under (a) or (b)). See article 6(1) APRR. 
29 In a reasonable relation to the waiting time. See articles 6(1)(i) and 9(1)(a) APRR. 
30 Or telex or fax messages, or e-mails. See articles 6(1)(i) and 9(2) APRR. 
31 Where a stay of one or more nights becomes necessary, or where a stay additional to that intended by the 
passenger becomes necessary. See articles 6(1)(ii) and 9(1)(b) APRR. 
32 See articles 6(1)(ii) and 9(1)(b) APRR. 
33 Sturgeon and others v Condor and Böck and Lepuschitz v Air France (Joined Cases C-402/07 & C-432/07) 
EU:C:2009:716. 
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entitled to financial compensation up to EUR 600 (the amount depends on the distance of the flight)34 
when they suffer a loss of time equal to or in excess of three hours.35, 36 Lastly, when the delay is at 
least five hours the APRR requires that passengers must be offered the choice between the excessively 
delayed flight, or the reimbursement of the full cost of the ticket,37 together with, when relevant, a 
return flight to the first point of departure.38 
The second type of damage (b) is individual damage, inherent in the reason for travelling. This kind of 
redress, according to the ECJ, requires a case-by-case assessment of the extent of the damage caused 
and can consequently only be the subject of compensation granted subsequently on an individual 
basis.39 It is this type of damage that the ECJ finds to be covered by the MC. 
According to the Court, the MC drafters did not intend to shield carriers from any other form of 
intervention. An example of such an intervention was given by the Court: an action by the public 
authorities in order to (1) redress, (2) in a standardised and immediate manner, (3) the damage that is 
constituted by the inconvenience that delay causes, (4) without the passengers having to suffer the 
inconvenience inherent in the bringing of actions for damages before the courts. Whether it is 
coincidental or not, the assistance and care of passengers as envisaged by article 6 APRR fits the given 
example perfectly. Therefore, according to the ECJ, assistance and care are not regulated by the MC.40 
The ECJ concludes that both legal instruments are set up from different angles. The MC merely governs 
the conditions under which the passengers concerned may bring actions for damages by way of redress 
on an individual basis, that is to say for compensation, from the carriers liable for damage resulting 
from the delay. The APRR governs the conditions under which damage linked to the abovementioned 
inconvenience should be redressed. Because of this different set up, the Court is convinced that both 
instruments are complementary. In fact, the standardised and immediate assistance and care 
measures from article 6 APRR do not prevent passengers from being able to bring additional actions 
to redress that damage under the conditions laid down by the MC (should the same delay also cause 
them damage conferring entitlement to compensation). The system prescribed in article 6 APRR simply 
operates at an earlier stage than the system that results from the MC.41 
                                                          
34 Article 7(1) APRR: (a) EUR 250 for all flights of 1,500km or less; (b) EUR 400 for all intra-Community flights of 
more than 1,500km, and for all other flights between 1,500km and 3,500km; (c) EUR 600 for all flights not falling 
under (a) or (b). 
35 “Articles 5, 6 and 7 [APRR] must be interpreted as meaning that passengers whose flights are delayed may be 
treated, for the purposes of the application of the right to compensation, as passengers whose flights are 
cancelled and they may thus rely on the right to compensation laid down in Article 7 [APRR] where they suffer, 
on account of a flight delay, a loss of time equal to or in excess of three hours, that is, where they reach their final 
destination three hours or more after the arrival time originally scheduled by the air carrier. […]” (Sturgeon and 
Böck (Joined Cases C-402/07 & C-432/07), dictum 2) 
36 Concerning the ECJ’s error in calculating the three-hour timeframe, see van der Bruggen, “European air 
passenger rights: delay and cancellation”, [2015] European Journal of Consumer Law – Revue européenne de droit 
de la consommation, pp. 107–146, at pp. 121–126. 
37 Article 8(1)(a), para. 1 APRR: reimbursement within seven days […] of the full cost of the ticket at the price at 
which it was bought, for the part or parts of the journey not made, and for the part or parts already made if the 
flight is no longer serving any purpose in relation to the passenger's original travel plan. 
38 See articles 6(1)(iii) and 8(1)(a) APRR. 
39 See IATA (C-344/04), para. 43. 
40 See IATA (C-344/04), paras. 45–46. 
41 See IATA (C-344/04), paras. 44, 46 and 47. 
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Standardised? – For Dempsey and Johansson, the ECJ’s reasoning is unacceptable. They find the APRR 
not to be standardised, but particularised. Passenger rights under the APRR vary, and depend upon 
the distance flown and the time of delay.42 
It is indeed true that the APRR attaches different sorts of passenger rights to different sorts of 
situations (depending on the distance flown and the time of delay). Nonetheless, the question arises 
as to whether those particularised situations must therefore always result in (only) particularised 
damage. In other words, is it not possible that particularised situations result (partially) in damage that 
is almost identical for every passenger concerned – for example loss of time? 
Also, the ECJ did not mix passengers from different situations (passengers who had flown different 
distances and/or had experienced different lengths of delay). The Court referred to “passengers of an 
excessive delayed flight”. Therefore, the passengers in the Court’s hypothetical flight must be, per 
definitionem, in the same situation. The flight’s distance flown and time of delay would be the same 
for every passenger on board of this flight – for example, a 10-hour delay on a 5,000 kilometres flight. 
However, it is easy to imagine that even this hypothetical flight could result in damage that is not 
almost identical for every passenger. To illustrate, passenger A arrives 10 hours late at his home 
country X, while for passenger B country X was merely a stopover and he missed his connecting flight 
due to the 10-hour delay. For passenger B this can result in unforeseen hotel stays, transportation, etc. 
This example illustrates that non-particularised situations can also create particularised damage. 
To conclude this point, one could say that particularised and non-particularised situations can both 
result in particularised and/or non-particularised damage. However, this discussion (particularised or 
not) only shifts the question from “can the APRR and MC coexist?” to “can particularised and non-
particularised situations/damage coexist?” 
(Supra)national law – Article 19 MC reads as follows:  
The carrier is liable for damage occasioned by delay in the carriage by air of passengers, 
baggage or cargo. Nevertheless, the carrier shall not be liable for damage occasioned by delay 
if it proves that it and its servants and agents took all measures that could reasonably be 
required to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for it or them to take such measures. 
What damage is to be compensated is not specified in the MC. This omission in the provisions must 
therefore be covered by national law (agreed upon parties, or applicable via private international 
law).43 As a result, case law provides us with all kinds of possible damage caused by delay in the carriage 
of persons. For example: the costs of accommodation and food; the costs of a first class supplement 
(in order to get to the destination on time, albeit with a different air carrier); lost profit; uselessly 
wasted or affected holiday; illness contracted due to waiting for the delayed departure; etc.44 For EU 
Member States this “national law” is in fact ”European law”; they passed their competence on to the 
European Union. The EU itself, as a “Regional Economic Integration Organisation”, also ratified the MC. 
By doing so, the EU made the MC an integral part of the EU community’s legal order. Since the ECJ is 
                                                          
42 Dempsey and Johansson, “Montreal v. Brussels: The Conflict of Laws”, p. 219. 
43 See Giemulla and Schmid (eds.), Montreal Convention, Commentary, Chapter III, Article 19, para. 84 (and 
references). 
44 Examples given in Giemulla and Schmid (eds.), Montreal Convention, Commentary, Chapter III, Article 19, 
paras. 2, 84 and 85 (and references). 
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competent for interpreting the latter, the ECJ can interpret the MC. Just like any judge from the 
examples given, the ECJ can decide upon the sort of damage that is covered by the MC. In other words, 
the ECJ is competent and free to interpret the “damage occasioned by delay in the carriage by air of 
passengers” (cf. article 19 MC) as (only) “individual damage, inherent in the reason for travelling”. 
4. MC compensation and APRR compensation 
Article 22 MC – After discussing the ECJ’s two types of damage (section 3), this section examines the 
compensation that follows from both types of damage. In contrast to “damage”, the extent of the 
“compensation” is specified and limited by the MC. Article 22, paragraph 1 MC states: “In the case of 
damage caused by delay as specified in Article 19 [MC] in the carriage of persons, the liability of the 
carrier for each passenger is limited to [4,694]45 Special Drawing Rights [or EUR 5,979.64].”46 This 
means that every judge or court can identify different types of damage that are covered by the MC, 
but eventually each damage must result in the compensation foreseen and specified by the MC. In 
other words, as regards delay in the carriage of air passengers under the MC, there can be different 
types of damage, but the compensation that follows from them must fit the MC. 
As has been said, it is legally correct for the ECJ to identify two types of damage ((a) damage that is 
almost identical for every passenger; and (b) individual damage, inherent in the reason for travelling). 
As long as the total compensation for both these types of damage does not exceed the limits of article 
22 MC, there is conformity. What does not conform to the MC is that the two types of damage do not 
result in the compensation foreseen by the MC. Both types of damage, the “identical” and the 
“individual”, are “occasioned by the delay in the carriage by air of passengers” (cf. article 19MC). Both 
types of damage fall under article 19 MC and therefore the compensation for both types of damage 
must be limited in amount, according to article 22 MC. But let us come back to this shortly (below, “4.2 
Supplementary compensation, One ceiling for all?”). 
 4.1 Further compensation 
Article 12 APRR – Article 12 APRR states that “[the APRR] shall apply without prejudice to a passenger's 
rights to further compensation. The compensation granted under [the APRR] may be deducted from 
such compensation.” 
In the Sousa Rodríguez case47 the following question was referred to the ECJ:  
Is the term “further compensation”, used in Article 12 [APPR], to be interpreted as meaning 
that […] the national court may award compensation for damage, including non-material 
damage, for breach of a contract of carriage by air in accordance with rules established in 
national legislation and case-law on breach of contract or, on the contrary, must such 
compensation relate solely to appropriately substantiated expenses incurred by passengers 
and not adequately indemnified by the carrier in accordance with the requirements of Articles 
8 and 9 [APRR], even if such provisions have not been relied upon or, lastly, are the two 
                                                          
45 This is the reviewed limit. The initial number in the MC was 4,150. 
46 For a Special Drawing Rights (SDR) Currency Exchange Rate Conversion Calculator, see for example 
<http://coinmill.com/SDR_calculator.html#SDR=4694> (last visited 12 February 2017). 
47 Sousa Rodríguez and others v Air France (C-83/10) EU:C:2011:652. 
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aforementioned notions of further compensation compatible one with another? (Sousa 
Rodríguez (C-83/10), paragraph 24(2)) 
The Court translated this into two questions: (a) whether, in respect of the “further compensation” 
provided for by article 12 APRR, the national court may order the air carrier to pay for all types of 
damage arising from breach of contract in accordance with national rules; and (b) whether such 
“further compensation” may cover expenses incurred by passengers due to the failure of the air carrier 
to fulfil its obligations to assist and provide care under articles 8 and 9 APRR.48 
At the outset, the ECJ points out that the APRR establishes minimum rights for air passengers. The 
“further” compensation granted to air passengers on the basis of article 12 APRR is intended to 
supplement the application of measures provided for by the APRR. This is in order to compensate air 
passengers for the entirety of the damage that they suffered due to the failure of the air carrier to fulfil 
its contractual obligations. The Court reminds us that the APRR’s standardised and immediate 
measures do not prevent passengers from also bringing additional actions to redress damage under 
the conditions laid down by the MC.49 It is therefore clear to the Court that article 12 APRR allows the 
national court to order the air carrier to compensate for damage arising from breach of the contract 
of carriage by air on a legal basis other than the APRR, in particular under the conditions provided for 
by the MC and national law.50 
What the national court cannot do, according to the ECJ, is order an air carrier, on the basis of article 
12 APRR, to reimburse passengers whose flight has been delayed or cancelled the expenses the 
passengers have incurred because of the failure of the carrier to fulfil its obligations to assist51 and 
provide care52 under articles 8 and 9 APRR. Air passengers’ claims based on the rights conferred on 
them by the APRR cannot be considered as falling within “further compensation”. However, there is 
nothing in the APRR that precludes the awarding of compensation (in respect of a failure to fulfil the 
obligations provided for by articles 8 and 9 APRR), if those provisions are not invoked by the air 
passengers.53 
With the Sousa Rodríguez case clarifying the relationship between the APRR and the MC, a system 
becomes clear. Passengers of a delayed flight all suffer a same type of damage, damage that is almost 
identical for every one of them. The APRR requires that redress must be provided for this damage, in 
the form of standardised and immediate assistance and care (to be provided by the air carrier). If (some 
of) the passengers concerned also suffer individual damage, inherent in the reason for travelling, they 
can claim damages under the MC (or the applicable national law). Article 12 APRR allows this. The ECJ 
sees compensation for individual damage as supplementary to the compensation required in the APRR. 
According to the Court, the APRR provides for minimum rights/compensation, while the MC provides 
for supplementary, further compensation. If a carrier does not provide passengers with the APRR’s 
minimum rights/compensation, passengers can still claim these damages afterwards, but not under 
                                                          
48 See Sousa Rodríguez (C-83/10), para. 36. 
49 The ECJ refers to IATA (C-344/04), para. 47. 
50 See Sousa Rodríguez (C-83/10), paras. 37–39. 
51 The ECJ describes the obligation to assist as the reimbursement of the ticket or the re-routing to the final 
destination, while taking into account the cost of transfer between the airport of arrival and the originally 
scheduled airport. 
52 The ECJ describes the obligation to care as the provision in meals, accommodation and communication. 
53 See Sousa Rodríguez (C-83/10), paras. 42, 43 and 45. 
10 
 
the heading of “supplementary compensation”. The passengers concerned have been denied their 
“minimum compensation”, not their “further, supplementary compensation”. 
 4.2 Supplementary compensation 
Although Dempsey and Johansson state that the ECJ believes the APRR compensation to be 
supplementary to the damages recoverable under article 19 MC (instead of vice versa), they make two 
pertinent remarks concerning supplementarity. First, the ECJ’s supplementary regime would mean 
that passengers are free to receive double recovery under both the EU rules and the MC. Second, the 
overall amounts recovered by a passenger may thus exceed the liability ceiling provided in the MC 
(4,694 Special Drawing Rights (SDR)), which is clearly antithetical to the liability ceilings set out in the 
MC.54 
Double recovery – It is true, as Dempsey and Johansson state, that, as a rule, damage cannot be 
recovered twice. One cannot receive compensation twice for the same damage.55 However, this rule 
only applies for the same damage. If someone suffers two different types of damage, that person can 
be compensated twice – once for every type of damage. The latter reasoning is exactly the one applied 
by the ECJ in the IATA case. The ECJ saw that passengers of a delayed flight suffered two types of 
damage: (a) damage that is almost identical for every passenger; and (b) individual damage, inherent 
in the reason for travelling. So, following the IATA reasoning, there is no double recovery. There are 
two types of damage, and each type is compensated only once (via its own specific regulatory 
framework). 
Exceeding the MC’s liability ceiling – In this context, I would like to come back to article 12 APRR and 
focus on its last sentence: “[The APRR] shall apply without prejudice to a passenger's rights to further 
compensation. The compensation granted under [the APRR] may be deducted from such 
compensation.” As already mentioned (above, “4. MC compensation and APRR compensation, Article 
22 MC”), there is no problem in identifying two types of damage, as long as the total compensation for 
both does not exceed the limits of article 22 MC. Both types of damage fall under article 19 MC 
(“damage occasioned by the delay in the carriage by air of passengers”) and therefore the 
compensation for both types of damage must be limited in amount according to article 22 MC. 
Following this reasoning, the text of article 12 APRR should be interpreted as “The compensation 
granted under [the APRR] must be deducted from such compensation.” If not, the overall amounts 
recovered by a passenger may exceed the MC’s liability ceiling. 
Also, the APRR itself provides another argument in favour of the “must be deducted” theory. For 
passengers departing with an EU Community Carrier from an airport located in a third country and 
flying to an airport situated in the EU, the APRR’s scope is limited. In accordance with its article 3(1)(b), 
the APRR is not applicable for passengers who “received benefits or compensation and were given 
assistance in that third country”. It seems that the EU also does not want to over- or double 
compensate for damage. If compensation has already taken place in a third country, the EU does not 
compensate the passenger for a second time. The first compensation is taken into account in order to 
calculate the (possible) second one. 
                                                          
54 Dempsey and Johansson, “Montreal v. Brussels: The Conflict of Laws”, pp. 219–220. 
55 Punitive, exemplary or other non-compensatory damages not taken into account. 
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The van der Lans case56 contributes to this context. The ECJ stated that:  
Although Article 3(1)(b) [APRR] does not require it to be proved that the passenger concerned 
has actually obtained the benefits or compensation and assistance in a third country, the mere 
possibility of entitlement cannot of itself justify the conclusion that the regulation is not 
applicable to that passenger. (van der Lans (C-257/14), paragraph 27) 
It is unacceptable for the ECJ that a passenger could be deprived of the APRR’s protection solely on the 
ground that he may benefit from some compensation in the third country. There must be evidence 
that that compensation corresponds to the purpose of the compensation guaranteed by the APRR or 
that the conditions to which the beneficiary is subject and the various means of implementing it are 
equivalent to those provided for by the APRR.57 Some questions arise: What if the third country 
compensation corresponds to another purpose than the one in the APRR? Does this also mean that 
both compensations compensate for different types of damage? If not, the same damage is 
compensated twice. If so, there is a risk that the total compensation for the different types of damage 
exceeds the limits of article 22 MC. The same can be said concerning the third country compensation’s 
“conditions” and “means of implementing”. If, for example, the harder conditions for the third country 
compensation are met by the passenger concerned (and thus he received the third country 
compensation), should he also be entitled to the APRR compensation, because the conditions are not 
equivalent? When the same (type of) damage is compensated twice, double recovery takes place. If it 
concerns compensation for different types of damage, article 22 MC’s limits must be taken into 
account. 
One ceiling for all? – However, is it correct to assume that the limits of article 22 MC must be taken 
into account when different types of damage are compensated? As has been mentioned, the ECJ is 
competent for interpreting the MC. In the IATA case, the ECJ interpreted the concept of “damage”, as 
it occurs in articles 19, 22 and 29 MC, and divided it into two types of damage, one type being covered 
by the APRR, the other by the MC. Although not stated, this division also has an impact on article 22’s 
liability ceiling. Since the MC does not cover ”identical” damage, but only ”individual” damage, the 
liability ceiling from the MC’s individual damage system cannot be applied to the APRR’s identical 
damage system. Each type of damage has its own compensation system. Rules – and ceilings – cannot 
be combined because every set of rules regulates a different kind of damage. Therefore, the liability 
ceiling from article 22 MC cannot apply to “identical” damage. It applies only to “individual” damage. 
This is the consequence of the IATA case reasoning. 
Deducting “APRR compensation” from “further compensation” via the MC? – In the ECJ’s logic, 
whenever a passenger receives “further compensation” via the MC, one could say that the 
compensation granted under the APRR should not be deducted from it (cf. article 12 APRR), because 
both compensations compensate for a different type of damage. If there are two types of damage, 
each type has to be compensated. After setting up two separate systems in order to compensate for 
two separate types of damage, why would the ECJ deduct the one compensation from the other? Keep 
in mind that the ECJ is convinced of the APRR’s aim to ensure a high level of protection for passengers58 
                                                          
56 van der Lans v Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij (C-257/14) EU:C:2015:618. 
57 See also van der Lans (C-257/14), paras. 19–31. 
58 Preamble APRR, recitals 1 and 2; van der Lans (C-257/14), para. 26. 
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and wants to compensate air passengers for the entirety of their damage.59 With deduction, one type 
of damage will not (or not fully) be compensated. Therefore, deduction can only take place if it 
concerns the same type of damage – which is not the case for the APRR vis-à-vis the MC. 
Example: John’s flight was delayed for 24 hours. Due to this delay he suffered 1,000 units of identical 
damage and 4,000 units of individual damage. The total amount of damage is 5,000 units (STEP 1). 
After the APRR compensates John’s identical damage (1,000 units), his damage balance is down to 
4,000 units of individual damage (STEP 2). With the MC in his hand, John claims the 4,000 units of 
individual damage in court. The judge deducts the 1,000 units of identical damage (compensated via 
the APRR) from the remaining 4,000 units of individual damage and grants the result of 3,000 units 
(4,000 – 1,000 = 3,000) to John. As a result, John gets compensated (via the MC) for the amount of 
3,000 units, but remains uncompensated for 1,000 units of individual damage (STEP 3). If the judge 
had not deducted the APRR compensation from the MC compensation, he would have granted John 
4,000 units. As a result, John would have received compensation (via the MC) for 4,000 units, and (with 
the APRR compensation for 1,000 units) end up with all his 5,000 units of damage being compensated 
(STEP 4). In this context, a judge should therefore not deduct the APRR compensation from the MC 
compensation. 
The following graph illustrates this example: 
 
Deducting “APRR compensation” from “further compensation” via national law? – How likely is it that 
the passenger concerned will receive “further compensation” via national law and that deduction 
takes place? Well, let us do the maths. Today there are 193 countries in the world.60 The MC is ratified 
                                                          
59 Sousa Rodríguez (C-83/10), para. 38. 
60 The number “193” does not reflect a political vision, nor is it a political statement. The number is chosen for 
its convenience and refers to the number of United Nations (UN) Member States. Source: UN, 
<http://www.un.org/en/sections/about-un/overview/index.html> (last visited 12 February 2017). 
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by 122 states.61 Supposing that all of these 122 countries respect the MC’s exclusivity, they will not 
have national law that supplements the MC (concerning air carriers’ liability in the case of delay). Their 
national law is de facto the MC. Continuing on the ECJ’s reasoning, APRR compensation (for ”identical 
damage”) will not be deducted from the “further compensation” received under these 122 countries’ 
national law (de facto the MC), because the latter covers a different type of damage (de facto 
“individual damage”). So, after crossing out these 122 countries, deduction is now potentially possible 
in 71 countries. Moreover, if we subtract the number of countries that are not an MC State Party, but 
who are a WC State Party62 (articles 19, 22 and 29 MC correspond with articles 19, 22 and 24 WC; by 
analogy, both conventions only cover “individual damage”), the possible number goes down to 34. In 
order to make deduction possible, the remaining 34 countries must not only compensate for the same 
type of damage as the APRR does, their awarded compensation/minimum rights must also be higher 
and supplementary to what is offered by the APRR. If not, it is impossible to deduct the APRR 
compensation (if X is lower than Y, one cannot deduct Y from X).63 As a result, there is only a small 
chance that the APRR compensation could be deducted from the supplementary “further 
compensation” via national law. 
5. Material and non-material damages for delay 
US – Another big difference between the US and the EU is the recoverable damages. In the US, as 
stated by Tompkins, the damages recoverable as a result of delay are seldom of a significant amount 
and are restricted to economic “out-of-pocket expenses”. If there is no economic loss, there is no 
recovery under the MC. In addition to the limitation of the air carrier’s liability, the “all necessary 
measures” defence of article 19 MC (“the carrier shall not be liable for damage occasioned by delay if 
it proves that it and its servants and agents took all measures that could reasonably be required to 
avoid the damage or that it was impossible for it or them to take such measures”) plays a significant 
role in averting liability or minimising recoverable damages. As a result, recoverable damages in the 
case of delay are: telephone calls, meals, hotel accommodation, taxi and similar expenses.64 
Case law showed that damages for emotional distress or injury (without physical or pecuniary loss), 
inconvenience (without economic damage), loss of a memorable vacation, etc. are not recoverable.65 
Some US courts have expressed uncertainty as to whether damages can be awarded for emotional 
                                                          
61 Status of ratification (MC): ICAO, <http://icao.int/secretariat/legal/List%20of%20Parties/Mtl99_EN.pdf> (last 
visited 12 February 2017). 
62 The WC is the ancestor of the MC and counts 152 parties (37 of them are not an MC State Party). Status of 
ratification (WC): ICAO, <http://www.icao.int/secretariat/legal/List%20of%20Parties/WC-HP_EN.pdf> (last 
visited 12 February 2017). 
63 For example: Passenger A received EUR 600 compensation for his delayed flight. According to his national law 
– not the MC – passenger A could only receive EUR 25 compensation for the same type of damage as covered by 
the APRR. The national law’s EUR 25 is not supplementary to the APRR’s EUR 600. The latter encloses the former. 
Therefore, the national law compensation (EUR 25) cannot be awarded in order to reduce the APRR 
compensation (EUR 600); the national law compensation simply cannot be awarded, because the damage is 
already compensated (by the APRR). Otherwise, there would be a problem of double recovery for the same 
damage. 
64 See Tompkins, Liability Rules Applicable to International Air Transportation, p. 237. 
65 For references to case law, see Tompkins, Liability Rules Applicable to International Air Transportation, pp. 
237–239. 
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distress, or inconvenience, or whether proof of economic or physical injury caused by the delay is 
required, although these views are, according to Tompkins, in the minority.66 
EU – In its Walz case67 the ECJ had to answer the following question: “[must] the term ‘damage’, which 
underpins Article 22(2) [MC] that sets the limit of an air carrier’s liability for the damage resulting, inter 
alia, from the loss of baggage, […] be interpreted as including both material and non-material 
damage?” After repeating that the MC does not contain any definition of the term “damage” and the 
Court has jurisdiction to give a preliminary ruling concerning its interpretation,68 the ECJ referred to 
article 31(2) of the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.69 Since the 
latter text is drawn up by the International Law Commission of the United Nations, the ECJ holds that 
article 31(2) therefore provides the ordinary meaning of the term “damage” that is common to all the 
international law sub-systems.70 As a result, the ECJ concludes that “damage” must be interpreted as 
including both material and non-material damage, and that this corresponds with the MC’s spirit.71 
Although the “damage” in the Walz case concerned “damage resulting from the loss of baggage”, the 
interpretation can be transposed to damage occasioned by delay in the carriage of passengers. The 
ECJ clearly stated that “the term ‘damage’, referred to in Chapter III of the Montreal Convention, must 
be construed as including both material and non-material damage”.72 Since Chapter III MC also 
encompasses the carrier’s liability for damage occasioned by delay, the damage clarification in Walz 
also applies to this cause of damage. The latter was expressis verbis confirmed in the later Sousa 
Rodríguez case.73 
6. Proposal: identical compensation (APRR) as part of individual 
compensation (MC) 
In what follows, a proposal is made that attempts to bring the conflicting views and legal instruments 
closer together. The problems that we encountered throughout this text are referred to, and the 
advantages that the proposal offers are explained.  
Proposal – Considering “identical damage” as a subdivision of “individual damage” could create more 
legal consistency. When a flight is delayed, all the passengers individually suffer damage – individual 
damage. They may have a part of that individual damage in common with other passengers – identical 
damage. Nevertheless, this sort of common damage remains individual. As shown in the following 
diagrams, passengers A, B and C each suffered, individually, different forms of damage (the circles with 
different patterns). An element of their damage is common to all three (the solid black circle), but it 
remains part of the damage that they each suffered individually. 
                                                          
66 See Tompkins, Liability Rules Applicable to International Air Transportation, pp. 238–239 (including references 
to case law). 
67 Walz v Clickair (C-63/09) EU:C:2010:251. 
68 Walz (C-63/09), paras. 20–21. 
69 UN, “Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts”, annex to General Assembly Resolution 56/83 
of 12 December 2001, <http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft_articles/9_6_2001.pdf> (last 
visited 12 February 2017). 
70 Walz (C-63/09), paras. 27–28. 
71 Walz (C-63/09), paras. 30–38. 
72 Walz (C-63/09), paras. 25–26 and 29. 
73 Sousa Rodríguez (C-83/10), para. 41. 
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Since both the MC and the APRR are likely to remain in force, it is preferable to make both legal 
instruments work (in a complementary way). The requirement for more legal certainty leads to a need 
for one comprehensive framework that covers both instruments. The idea is that the MC and the APRR 
coexist, not next to each other but in relation to each other. Both instruments are interconnected 
– after all, they regulate the same issue. As described above, “identical damage” is to be seen as part 
of/a subdivision of ”individual damage”. If the APRR covers identical damage and the MC covers 
individual damage, the analogous conclusion is that the APRR compensation should be seen as a part 
of/a subdivision of the MC compensation. Where the MC regulates liability and compensation in 
general, the APRR regulates some specific situations and issues. The APRR’s framework therefore falls 
within the MC’s framework. In other words, the MC is the APRR’s bigger picture and sets the 
boundaries. Within those boundaries specific topics can be regulated, 
which is exactly what the APRR does. The basic idea is visualised in the 
diagram on the right. 
Exclusivity and coexistence – This proposal unites the “exclusivity” and 
“coexistence” views. In this proposal, the MC still sets the boundaries 
– exclusively. The APRR cannot go further than the MC. The MC 
exclusively regulates the framework, and the APRR can (only) 
manoeuver within that framework. At the same time, this proposal 
allows both instruments to coexist. 
Compensation and ceiling – The liability ceiling provided in the MC is 4,694 SDR. According to this 
proposal, the APRR cannot go beyond this limit. What the APRR can do is concretise the MC 
compensation within those limits. In other words, the APRR compensation only works out and 
elaborates the practicalities of the right to be compensated, as set out generally and theoretically in 
the MC. 
The MC’s liability ceiling being applicable to the APRR also addresses some concerns from within the 
aviation industry. In the APRR, some of the carriers’ obligations are unlimited. When Iceland’s 
Eyjafjallajökull volcano erupted on 14 April 2010, many European countries had to close their airspace 
for several days. On top of the significant impact on airlines’ costs and revenues (the Association of 
European Airlines (AEA) evaluated loss of revenue at EUR 850 million for the period from 15 April to 
23 April), airlines also faced the cost of providing unlimited hotel accommodation and other assistance 
to stranded passengers. The AEA has estimated that it cost just under EUR 200 million for passenger 
MC
APRR
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rights exposure for their member airlines (who provided 40–50% of the seats in the affected 
airspace).74 
In the European Commission’s proposal for amending the APRR, a limited number of measures are 
proposed in order to better take into account the financial capacities of the air carriers. One of those 
measures is that in the case of delays and cancellations due to extraordinary circumstances, the air 
carrier may limit the right to accommodation to three nights with a maximum of EUR 100 per night 
and passenger.75 As stated above, it would be more legally consistent to limit the passenger rights and 
compensation in the APRR to that agreed in the MC (4,694 SDR). 
Further compensation and double recovery – The author’s proposal sees the APRR compensation as a 
part of/a subdivision of the MC compensation. As a consequence, both the APRR and the MC cover 
“damage occasioned by delay in the carriage by air of passengers” (cf. article 19 MC). The APRR simply 
compensates a specific part of this damage; the rest is covered by the MC. In the words of the ECJ, 
“[the] APRR simply operates at an earlier stage than the […] MC”.76 If a passenger suffers damage, a 
first part will be compensated by the APRR. Afterwards, if further compensation is needed – if there is 
another part left – the passenger can turn to the MC, which can compensate for the rest of the damage. 
In this sense, the proposal also tackles the fear of double compensation. After the APRR has 
compensated its own specific part of the damage, only the remaining part can be compensated by the 
MC. The same (part of the) damage will not be compensated twice. 
Damage and deduction – Since both the APRR and the MC cover “damage occasioned by delay in the 
carriage by air of passengers” (cf. article 19 MC), consequently a correct deduction should take place. 
The proposal helps to interpret article 12 APRR’s deduction rule: the part of damage that is 
compensated by the APRR should be deducted from the total amount of “damage occasioned by delay 
in the carriage by air of passengers”, not from the remaining part of damage (which is to be 
compensated by the MC). In other words, the APRR compensation (part a) must not be deducted from 
the MC compensation (the remaining part, part b), but from the total amount of compensation for the 
damage occasioned by delay (part a + part b = total compensation). 
Author’s objective – In this paper the author has attempted to clarify the interconnection between the 
MC and the APRR, together with the legal consequences. His objective has been to lead the reader 
from “certain uniformity” to “certain certainty”. 
 
Renzo van der Bruggen 
                                                          
74 See also IATA, “Economic briefing May 2010: The impact of the Eyjafjallajökull’s volcanic ash plume” 
<https://www.iata.org/whatwedo/Documents/economics/Volcanic-Ash-Plume-May2010.pdf> (last visited 12 
February 2017), pp. 3–4; Kallas, “The impact of the volcanic ash cloud crisis on the air transport industry”, 
SEC(2010) 533, Information note to the European Commission (27 April 2010), para. 14. 
75 See also Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) 
No 261/2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied 
boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights and Regulation (EC) No 2027/97 on air carrier liability in 
respect of the carriage of passengers and their baggage by air, COM(2013) 130 final, Explanatory Memorandum, 
section 3.3.2, second bullet. 
76 See IATA (C-344/04), para. 46. 
